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Re$toring Politics to Political History If history 
ever was simply the study of past politics, it is no longer. Dis-
satisfied with narratives of Great Men, more interested in analyz-
ing the impact of larger forces and in tracing out patterns of the 
lives of the masses of people, skeptical that a recounting of election 
campaigns and a counting of votes reveals much about social 
thought or action, strongly affected by currents of opinion which 
have long run deep in France, American historians have turned 
increasingly to social history. Others, perhaps those more com-
fortable with mathematics, have concentrated on economic his-
tory. Even most practitioners of the "new political history" have 
focused chiefly on the effect of social forces on politics or have 
used votes as a measure of society's opinions. Political history is 
in danger of becoming a mere branch of social history. 1 
Yet this transformation has not gone unchallenged. Although 
"brought up on the idea that political history was obsolete and 
out of date," Le Goff, a French historian, contends that politics 
as the study of power may not be the "backbone of history," but 
should be its "nucleus.,. Crihcal as they are of quantitative studies, 
moreover, Fox-Genovese and Genovese, who are Marxists, assert 
that history "is primarily the story of who rides whom and how" 
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and insist therefore, that history is an "essentially political pro-
cess." Nor are social historians alone in their concern for the 
excluded political dimension. In his recent presidential address to 
the Economic History Association, Davis warned his colleagues 
that "if we are to understand economic history we must be able 
to understand and to explain the behavior of the government 
sector." And, reflecting the emphasis on theory, which has been 
such a central part of the training and practice of economic his-
torians, Davis highlights the "potential for successful collabora-
tion between political history and theory." 2 
Political historians, not yet resigned to the annihilation of 
political history favored by some social historians, nor relegated 
to the subordinate roles promoted by the imperialists from social 
and economic history, have been reshaping and extending their 
own territory. Paralleling developments in political science, the 
new agenda for political history now spans the whole political 
process from the expression of the society's underlying socioeco-
nomic divisions in elections to the formation of policies by elected 
and appointed officials and the delineation of the consequences of 
those policies for the soci~ry. Historians have also recently laid a 
good deal of stress on the effect of institutional rules in shaping 
candidate strategies, electoral results, and policy choices. What is 
new about these emerging trends in the political history literature 
is the rediscovery of the importance of electoral rules and the 
initiation of an effort to connect policy to the behavior of voters 
and candidates. Since political scientists have been studying these 
particular problems for much longer than have political historians, 
what can historians learn from them? 3 
2 Le Goff, "Is Politics Still the Backbone of History?" 337, 349. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese 
and Eugene D. Genovese, "The Political Crisis of Social History," journal of Social History, 
X (1976), 219. Distinctions between the various realms of human endeavor are inevitably 
somewhat arbitrary, and there will always be arguments about the proper classification of 
activities on various boundaries. In this arricle I shall concentrate on the comparative 
effects of two distinct types of influences on the adoption and administration of policies 
by legal governments-first, such clearly political actions as setting institutional rules, 
voting, and taking positions on what governing authorities should do; second, such 
patently socioeconomic factors as a society's economic resources. Lance E. Davis, "It's a 
Long, Long Road to Tipperary, or Reflections on Organized Violence, Protection Rates, 
and Related Topics: The New Political History," journal of Economic History, XL (1980), 
2, 8. 
3 The link between policies and their consequences for the society has rarely been 
explored systematically by historians, probably because it is so difficult to sort out the 
I 
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In the Balkanized discipline of political science, practitioners 
in the two subfields most closely related to the electoral politics-
policy link and the problem of institutional rules seldom confront 
each other. The first field, spatial models of party or candidate 
competition, is at the extreme abstract or theoretical end of po-
litical science, whereas the second, the policy outputs area, is an 
intellectual continent away, in deepest empiricism. 
Although historians are still largely unaware of the existence 
of spatial models, some have scouted the policy outputs literature. 
Yet these historians have been too quick to accept the largely 
deterministic, anti-political orthodoxy propounded by Dye and 
other political scientists-an orthodoxy which, if accepted by 
historians, would further subordinate political to social and eco-
nomic history. McCormick, for instance, recently summarized 
the opinion of the dominant school of policy analysis that both 
electoral behavior and- policy formation were, in McCormick's 
words, "fundamentally shaped not by one another but jointly by 
factors beyond politics" and then took that opinion as a starting 
point for an overview of nineteenth-century American politics. 
A review of the subfield of spatiaLmodeling and its relationship 
to questions of policy outputs, however, will suggest other, more 
complex insights and will point political history, as Davis has 
advocated, in the direction of more self-conscious and systematic 
theorizing. 4 
impact of specific policies from other possible causes. Discovering methods for such 
sorting should be one of the prime tasks of political history. Allan G. Bogue, "The New 
Political History in the 1970s," in Kammen (ed.), Past Before Us, 251, found that up to 
mid-1979, most "new political historians" had ignored the interactions between popular 
voting and policy. The trend is very new. Works exemplifying the trend include Richard 
L. McCormick, "The Party Period and Public Policy: An Explor:ttory Hypothesis," 
Journal of American History, LXVI (1979), 279-298;). Rogers Hollingsworth and Ellen jane 
Hollingsworth, Dimensions in Urban History: Historical and Social Science Perspectives on 
Middle-Size American Cities (Madison, 1979). Recent treatments of the effects of institu-
tional rules include Paul Kleppner and Stephen C. Baker, "The Impact of Voter Regis-
tration Requirements on Electoral Turnout, 190Q-1916," Journal of Political and Military 
Sociology, VIII (1980), 205-226; Kousser, "Progressivism-For Middle-Class Whites 
Only"; Peter H. Argersinger, "'A Place On the Ballot': Fusion Politics and Antifusion 
Laws," American Historical Review, LXXXV (1980), 287-3o6; Gary W. Cox and Kousser, 
"Turnout and Rural Corruption: New York as a Test Case," American journal of Political 
Science, XXV (1981), 646-663. 
4 McCormick, "Party Period," 292. Although he offers many interesting insights, 
McCormick too easily accepts the ethnoculturalists' view of certain crucial issues as merely 
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THE POLICY OUTPUTS LITERATURE, like SO much else in political 
science, begins with Key. In his classic Southern Politics, Key 
combined values, theory, and speculation to make a set of famous 
and influential remarks: 
Politics generally comes down, over the long run, to a conflict 
between those who have and those who have less. In state politics 
the crucial issues tend to turn around taxation and expenditure. 
What level of public education and what levels of other public 
services shall be maintained? How shall the burden of taxation for 
their support be distributed? ... It follows that the grand objective 
of the haves is obstruction, at least of the haves who take only a 
short-term view. Organization is not always necessary to obstruct; 
it is essential, however, for the promotion of a sustained program 
in behalf of have-nots. . . . It follows, if these propositions are 
correct, that over the long run the have-nots lose in a disorganized 
politics. 
Noting also that the have-nots in the South were often disfran-
chised by law, practice, or habit, Key concluded that the one-
party factionalism of the South in that period produced an "is-
sueless politics," an unhealthy social system, and a starved set of 
public services for the masses. 5 
In the 1960s, Key's generalizations came under heavy attack, 
as quantitative comparisons of expenditures and other outputs of 
government across cities, states, and nations enjoyed a consider-
able vogue in political science. Lacking a theory of the connections 
between the individual decisions of the electorate and those of 
policymakers, the vast majority of the students of policy outputs 
symbolic and The American Voter's treatment of electors as unideological men whose 
partisan behavior merely mimicked their fathers'. See Kleppner, The Third Electoral System, 
1853-1892: Parties, Voters, and Political Cultures (Chapel Hill, 1979), 3-15; Angus Campbell, 
Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York, 
1964), 86-96; McCormick, "Party Period," 2.82.; Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth Di-
mensions in Urban History, 12. 1. Failing systematically to consider such large issues as 
slavery, sectionalism, tariffs, and financial policy, McCormick views nineteenth-century 
American governmental policy as primarily a series of unconnected· decisions about how 
to distribute localized public goods. However useful in reminding historians of an im-
portant and too often overlooked set of decisions, McCormick's scheme is not wholly 
convincing, for it diverts attention from most of the issues that politicians continually 
discussed. 
5 V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York, 1949), 307-310. 
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turned to a misleadingly simple and mechanistic conceptual 
scheme borrowed from systems analysis. Basically, their frame-
work consisted of labeled black boxes connected with directional 
arrows, most simply represented like this: 
Environmental ~ Political Inputs ~ Policy 
Factors (Turnout, Outputs 
(Demand, Capability) Competition, Etc.) ( $ ) 
I i 
The first studies generally interpreted Key as saying that polit-
ical inputs produced policy, and showed that that link was spu-
rious, since the simple product-moment correlation coefficients 
between inputs and outputs across the American states in a post-
World War II cross-section went to insignificance when one par-
tialled out the effects of such background variables as per capita 
income, urbanization, and industrialization. 6 More recent studies 
have seemingly settled on path analysis, or non-linear variations 
of that hierarchical system of regression equations, to make sim-
ilar findings on city, state, and national data sets. Dependent 
policy variables have ranged from highway or recreational expen-
ditures per capita to welfare expenditures, indices of policy in-
novation, measures of the redistributiveness of taxation and ex-
penditure systems, and proxies for the actual impact of various 
policies. The vast majority of the studies have been cross-sectional 
and have focused on recent statistics. 7 Although there have been 
many dissenters, the basic finding of most studies has been that 
mass politics makes little difference in policy formation. One 
recent literature review summed up the findings of the field by 
claiming that "electoral politics does not control the structure of 
6 Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States 
(Chicago, 1966), is the leading example. 
7 Gary L. Tomkins, "A Causal Model of State Welfare Expenditures," Journal of Politics, 
XXXVII (1975), 392-416; Gerald C. Wright, Jr., "Interparty Competition and State Social 
Welfare Policy: When a Difference Makes a Difference," ibid., 796-803; MichaelS. Lewis-
Beck, "The Relative Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public 
Policy," American Political Science Review, LXXI (1977), 449-466; Robert Jackman, Politics 
and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis (New York, 1975). For reference to and 
summaries of the literature, see Richard I. Hofferbert, "State and Community Policy 
Studies: A Review of Comparative Input-Output Analyses," Political Science Annual, III 
(1972), 3-72; Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, 1972). 
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expenditures and taxation, legislator voting patterns, or legislative 
policy." 8 
There are at least five reasons why historians should hestitate 
betore accepting the elitist and anti-institutional counsel of polit-
ical despair implied by the policy outputs literature. First, a point 
which occurs immediately to a historian: nearly all of the studies 
are time-bound, concentrated in the post-W odd War II period 
when the polity and policies of America, and indeed, the devel-
oped world, were becoming increasingly centralized and similar. 
Because of the growing policy emulation and central control 
across areas, and because of the increasing homogenization of 
political behavior, there is not a great deal of variance in the 
dependent variable to be explained, nor much variance in the 
independent political variables with which to explain anything. 9 
The recency of the data suggests a second point. As the 
incrementalist school of policy analysis has repeatedly reminded 
observers, many policy areas have become so bureaucratized in 
the post-war period that there simply is not enough "play" in 
these subsystems for electoral politics to have great effects. Bu-
reaucrats do make policy over a large range of well-established 
programs. 10 Since much of any agency's budget goes for salaries, 
and few politicians can really face up to throwing large numbers 
of government employees out of work, one should not expect 
8 Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, "Political Participation and Public Policy," 
Annual Review of Sociology, I (1975), 445. For a similar survey, see Dye and JohnS. Robey, 
'"Politics versus Economics': Development of the Literature on Policy Determination," 
in Dye and Virginia Gray, The Determinants of Public Policy (Lexington, Mass., 1980), 3-
17. 
9 The major exception, Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth, Dimensions in Urban History, 
is based on a sampling design which deliberately cut down the variations in both inde-
pendent and dependent variables by limiting the data to middle-sized American cities and 
by pooling data over an eight-year time span. 
10 McCormick, "Party Period," 297; Richard Winters, "Party Control and Policy 
Change," American Journal of Political Science, XX (1976), 597~36, both stress this point. 
As Bruce A. Williams has recendy emphasized, however, there is no inherent reason to 
classify bureaucratic behavior as non-political. I do so here only because the distinction is 
conventional in the literature and because bureaucratic behavior seems usually aimed at 
making only marginal changes in programs and budgets. A complete theory of the relation 
of politics to policy would have to include bureaucrats as actors. For suggestive brief 
introductions on this matter, see Williams, "Organizational Determinants of Policy 
Change," in Dye and Gray, Determinants of Public Policy, 49-59; Kenneth J. Meier and 
Kenneth W. Kramer, "Impact of Realigning Elections on Public Bureaucracies," in Bruce 
A. Campbell and Richard A. Trilling (eds.), Realignment in American Politics: Toward a 
Theory (Austin, 1980), 202-228. 
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electoral politics to have a great short-range impact on such pro-
grams. Where one should expect an impact is in previously un-
bureaucratized areas, or in periods before the bureaucratic thicket 
became so dense. In North Carolina from r88o to 1901, to take 
an instance to be more fully developed later in this article, the 
total state education bureaucracy consisted of an underpaid su-
perintendent and a half-time clerk. Education committees in the 
legislature turned over almost entirely with every election, which 
prevented the development of cosy legislative-bureaucratic ar-
rangements. Interest groups of teachers and local administrators 
were just getting started. In such a simple environment, the trans-
lation of political desire into policy could be swift and straight-
forward. 
A third general criticism is that the studies typically use cross-
sectional data or data from a relatively short time series. The 
problem with cross-sectional data is that all geographical units 
may be subject to the same fundamental trends-for example, 
inflation or recession may force nearly all governments to follow 
similar policies at the same time, since at any time they are likely 
to share a common conventional economic wisdom about cutting 
or expanding budgets to counteract fluctuations in the economy. 
Moreover, short developmental sequences may disguise major 
policy shifts, which often take a fairly long time to effectuate. 11 
Fourth, the policy output studies have sacrificed specificity 
for breadth of coverage, and more detailed studies may yield 
different conclusions. Suppose one found no correlation between 
party competition or turnout and, say, welfare support levels 
across time or space. Then it might be correct to conclude that 
politics made no difference in outcomes. But there are other 
alternatives. It might be that welfare did not appear prominently 
on the political agenda, a fact which a closer look at the election 
campaigns would disclose. If so, there would be no demands to 
be translated into policy, and the negligible correlation would be 
easily explained. Or it could be that many voters wished to cut 
taxes rather than raise welfare levels, or that the cutters and 
spenders more or less balanced each other out, in which case, 
II Gray, "Models of Comparative State Politics: A Comparison of Cross-Sectional and 
Time Series Analysis," American journal of Political Science, XX (1976), 235-256, demon-
strates that cross-sectional and time-series estimates of the same basic models of policy 
may yield quite different results. 
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again, the lack of political and policy correlation should be ex-
pected.12 
. The point is that mass demands for policy changes are in-
adequately represented in the policy outputs literature. Sometimes 
the socioeconomic background variables are treated as demands, 
sometimes as merely reflecting the capability of financing policies. 
More detailed studies and better proxies for demands might 
change the findings dramatically. 13 
To illustrate the potential importance of close studies, I turn 
again to late nineteenth-century North Carolina. The correlation 
across counties between property value per white family and 
expenditures per white student for seven cross sections from 1880 
to 1910 was high enough to swamp the effects of nearly every 
other independent variable which could be entered into a set of 
regression equations. Although, at first, one might believe that 
this finding supported those of the economic determinists in the 
policy outputs field, a closer look at the laws and constitution of 
the state would disclose the presence of a law, in effect from 1871 
to the 1920s, which set one statewide property tax rate, but 
directed that all taxes were to be spent in the county where they 
were collected. Further, a series of state court decisions virtually 
prohibited local taxation until 1905. The relation between wealth 
and expenditures, therefore, should be interpreted for this data set 
as showing not the weakness of the effect of political inputs on 
policy, but the strength of that impact. Before 1871, and for a time 
after 1933, state education revenues were collected centrally and 
12 Indeed, when Hollingsworth looked more closely at local electoral contests in three 
late nineteenth-century Wisconsin towns, he found that campaigns often lasted only a few 
days and usually only involved issues of personal morality. It is no wonder that he found 
no connection between turnout and expenditure changes there, for questions of expendi-
ture levels seem, for those times and places, not to have been matters of political conflict. 
See J. R. Hollingsworth, "The Impact of Electoral Behavior on Public Policy: The Urban 
Dimension, 1900," in Joel H. Silbey, Bogue, and William H. Flanigan (eds.), The History 
of American Electoral Behavior (Princeton, 1978), 367. R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce 
Shepard, "Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on The-
ories of Representative Government," American Political Science Review, LXX (1976), II27-
II35· 
1J Dye, Policy Analysis: What Governments Do, Why They Do It, and What Difference it 
Makes (University, Ala., 1976), 29, 42-43, 6o, 71-'73· Paul Burstein, "Citizen Preferences, 
the Party Balance, and Political Outcomes," paper delivered at American Political Science 
Association meeting (1978). One attempt to operationalize public opinion more precisely 
is Ronald E. Weber and William R. Shaffer, "Public Opinion and American State Policy-
Making," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI (1972), 683-<i99. 
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distributed to the counties in proportion to the number of educ-
able children-a completely egalitarian system. The reactionary 
Democrats who took control of North Carolina in a Ku Klux 
Klan coup d'etat in 1870, however, imposed an inegalitarian system 
on the state, which lasted for a half-century. The political under-
pinning of the artificially induced correlation between wealth and 
spending would be missed by an analyst who merely crunched 
the quantitative data. 14 
A fifth and final criticism of the policy outputs literature is 
that it lacks any microtheoretical structure. No individual people 
inhabit its black boxes; no human motives travel its causal arrows; 
no one, neither leaders nor followers, really acts. To employ 
systems analysis in social science is to mistake metaphor for the-
ory. Along with its sociological sibling, structural-functionalism, 
systems analysis in the passive voice of social science. 15 
In a recent effort'to move beyond the politics vs. economics 
theme in comparative policy studies, Stonecash has suggested 
viewing differences in political systems and wealth as "facilitative 
factors" which affect the process of converting demands into 
policy, rather than as direct reflections of demands. A move in 
the direction of more open and sustained competition among 
elites, the argument goes, should lead to a closer correspondence 
between public desires and government programs; wealth mag-
nifies the range of options which a public body can adopt, whereas 
poverty restricts the choice set. Although this seems both a logical 
step and an interpretation closer than others to Key's original 
formulation, it still leaves public opinion and the activities of 
political entrepreneurs outside the model, public opinion added 
exogenously, entrepreneurs simply not considered. Since this and 
other attempts to chart a theory for policy analysis neither satis-
factorily explain behavior at the individual level nor explicitly 
represent the politics of the decision-making apparatus, it is nec-
essary to move beyond the conventional writings in the field to 
identify some of the implicit assumptions in the comparative 
outputs literature, to provide a deeper and more complete under-
standing of some of its findings, and to suggest lines for further 
14 For more details, see Kousser, "Progressivism-for Middle-Class Whites Only." 
rs Cf. Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth, Dimensions in Urban History, 158. 
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empirical and theoretical work. One promising direction to take 
is toward studies of spatial models of party or candidate compe-
titidn.16 
If policy outputs is a social scientific field characterized by 
data without theory, spatial models is virtually its inverse-an 
area of theory without data. Spatial models generally appear in 
the guise of one-dimensional frequency distributions of public 
opinion on an issue or set of issues, most familiarly a symmetric 
unimodal distribution in which two parties compete for the fran-
chises of voters, who decide for whom to vote on the basis of the 
distance between their preferences and the issue positions of the 
candidates. The voter's behavior is typically assumed to be gov-
erned by a desire to maximize his economic welfare, whereas a 
candidate takes positions on the issues not because of his own 
ideological beliefs, but purely from a desire to maximize the votes 
he receives or the legislative seats his party obtains. The model 
has a vector representation for multi-dimensional space, and theo-
rems can be rigorously proved by symbolic logic, linear algebra, 
or game theory. Much of the early work consisted of trying to 
determine market-like equilibria or core solutions, and the best-
known result was that, under certain conditions, both parties 
converged to the position of the median voter. 17 
There are three problems with trying to apply the formal 
results of spatial models to policy analysis. First, the assumptions 
necessary to derive these results are violated by common obser-
vations in political science. For instance, all voters must agree at 
least roughly on the weights to be attached to each issue and on 
where each candidate stands; the candidates must take clear issue 
positions; and voter preferences cannot be changed by experiences 
during a campaign. Second, even if one suspends disbelief on 
these assumptions, it can be shown that an equilibrium does not 
exist if there are more than two candidates or if voters abstain 
because of alienation-that is, if they decide that neither candidate 
is sufficiently close to them that it is worthwhile trudging to the 
16 Jeff Stonecash, "Politics, Wealth, and Public Policy: The Significance of Political 
Systems," in Dye and Gray, Determinants of Public Policy, 21-37. 
17 Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competiton," The Economic Journal, XXIX (1929), 
41-57; Kenneth]. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York, 1951); Duncan 
Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge, 1958); Anthony Downs, An 
Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957). 
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polls. Third, even if equilibria did exist in these interesting and 
important cases, the elected politicians might not carry out their 
announced policies, either because the rules of the policy game 
robbed them of the power to deliver; they were incompetent; 
they changed their minds 'once in office; or, most simply, because 
they had lied during the campaign. As a result of these problems, 
the most recent work in the field, much of it experimental rather 
than mathematically deductive, has aimed at developing new and 
weaker solution concepts which will not absolutely guarantee the 
adoption of particular policy positions, but will be close enough, 
as one article has it, "for all practical purposes." 18 
We should not conclude that these difficulties render spatial 
models useless for comprehending policy, for every model nec-
essarily oversimplifies a complex reality and, in certain situations, 
most of the assumptions may hold approximately true. Most 
important for present purposes, the underlying ideas of spatial 
models can profitably be employed in a heuristic fashion to illu-
minate some of the competing views in the field of policy outputs. 
That is, the following diagrams can both help us to reflect upon 
the policy outputs literature and to understand just what assump-
tions about the behavior of individual electors and policymakers, 
as well as the effects of institutional arrangements, we are implic-
itly making when we predict various connections between inputs 
and outputs. 
Figure 1 is an attempt to turn Key's verbal model into a 
geometric spatial model. The horizontal axis here, and in subse-
quent figures, indexes the level of redistribution of private goods 
desired by each voter, and the vertical, the proportion of voters 
whose ideal point falls at any particular place on the one-dimen-
sional left-right continuum. There are no restrictions on voting, 
there is two-party competition, and both parties are assumed to 
keep their promises. The distribution of opinion is bimodal, and 
the left mode is higher than the right because there are more have-
18 The best introduction to recent fmdings on these issues raised by the first problem is 
Benjamin I. Page, Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral 
Democracy (Chicago, 1978). Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, 
"An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," Amer-
ican Political Science Review, LXIV (1970), 426-448. John A. Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina, 
and Herbert A. Weisberg, "Toward a Theory of Legislative Decision," in Ordeshook 
(ed.), Game Theory and Political Science (New York, 1978), 183, is the source of the 
quotation. 
sso I J. MORGAN KOUSSER 
Fig, 1 Key Geometrized-A 
First Cut 
P, 
% 
Attitudes on Redistribution 
Fig. 3 Disfranchisement and 
Discontinuity 
% 
,-'\ 
I \ 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
c, 
I I I \ ;r--" 
/ '../ I\ 
/' 1\ 
L R 
Attitudes on Redistribution 
Fig. 2 Left Promises, Right 
Performance 
% 
Attitudes on Redistribution 
Fig. 4 Public Opinion and 
Policy Disconnected 
, ..... 
I \ 
I \ 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I \ -, 
I \ / I 
,' ,..,.. \ 
I I 
1 I 
1 I 
, I 
L R 
Attitudes on Redistribution 
POLITICS AND POLITICAL HISTORY I 581 
nots than haves. Allowing voters to abstain either because of 
alienation or indifference, and assuming away the problems of 
incpmplete or fuzzy information, poorly behaved preference func-
tions, and disagreement on issue weighting, one intuitively expects 
to observe the two parties both taking issue positions close to the 
mean or median, say, at P1 and P2 • The governmental policies 
adopted should thus be fairly redistributive, as Key predicted. 
Reflection on this example suggests three observations. For 
the median result to hold, it must be assumed that all issues which 
have marked redistributive overtones can be collapsed into one 
dimension. Taxation and expenditure decisions must be made 
simultaneously; otherwise, it would be perfectly reasonable, for 
example, for a voter who, ceteris paribus, prefers more spending 
on welfare, but who is presented with a regressive and unchange-
able tax system, to vote against a candidate who agrees with him 
on welfare but who feels that the existing structure of taxation 
cannot be amended,· at least in the immediate future. 19 Further-
more, a voter who prefers redistributive expenditures on welfare 
must not, if the median result is to hold for all subject areas, 
prefer a non-distributive pattern of educational spending; if he 
holds these two positions simultaneously, the analyst must disen-
tangle the issues from each other, and such disentanglement may 
confuse the relationship of each issue to the progressivity of the 
tax system. 
Second, the result might not hold if many voters perceived 
the issue complex as not salient, or if they were too attached to 
a party or a candidate for these issues to make much difference. 
Third, this model assumes honest and competent parties. Sup-
pose, for instance, that the competing elites shared certain ideo-
logical presuppositions, or all craved approval from the upper 
classes, or all sought to raise campaign funds from people whose 
ideal points fell in the right-hand mode by satisfying the donors' 
policy desires. Or suppose that even if elected officials attempted 
19 This is not a strained example. Consider the difficulty of shifting the financing of 
social security from the regressive payroll tax to the income tax or, in many states, of 
replacing regressive sales taxes with more progressive taxes on income or wealth as the 
primary means of financing state contributions to education. An attempt to overcome this 
difficulty by excluding services financed through regressive taxes excludes too much 
policy. See Christopher Hewitt, "The Effect of Political Democracy and Social Equality 
on Equality in Industrial Societies: A Cross-National Comparison," American Sociological 
Review, XLII (1977), 450-464. 
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to carry out a policy, wily opponents or bureaucrats manipulated 
the rules to prevent them from doing so, or that the governing 
politicians were honorable, but simply inept. Then Figure 1 might 
turn into Figure 2, where the c's subscript the politicians' cam-
paign promises and the c's, the policies actually adopted when 
they formed a government. If the true experience is represented 
by Figure 2, which might aptly summarize the situation in parts 
of the United States just before the rise of the Populists or that 
in Great Britain when the Labour Party was in its infancy, then 
one would expect one of several things to occur: the rise of a 
leftist Party; a takeover of one of the two parties by a leftist-
such as George McGovern in 1972; an attempt to exclude leftist 
parties from competing-as in the Red Scares of 1918-1920 or the 
late 1940s in America; or a change in the institutional rules-such 
as David Lloyd George's threat to pack the House of Lords or 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's to pack the Supreme Court; or the re-
placement of a bumbling leader, such as Jimmy Carter. In the 
first two cases at least, the polity would probably eventually 
return to policies which pleased the median voter, but there could 
be a considerable time lag, and a cross-sectional study taken dur-
ing the lag might well conclude that there was no relation between 
competition and outputs. Since one way that the lower class could 
collectively guarantee that there was no divergence between 
promises and policy would be to select as leaders only those who 
were ideologically committed to the class' goals, a socialist party 
might be their best guarantee of a continuation of redistributive 
policies. 
Although Key sometimes spoke of parties as sets of compet-
ing elites interested only in maximizing pluralities, as the spatial 
modelers also assume, he hinted from time to time that he be-
lieved the "have-nots" needed a genuinely lower-class party in 
order to sustain a redistributive program. (Since he did not make 
the point explicit, he never had to come to grips with Michels.) 
Perhaps it was the unkept promises point which led Key to mix 
his "elite competition" and "lower-class party" notions. In any 
case, the two variants would lead to quite different predictions 
about the relations between political inputs and outputs. If the 
proletariat can trust its leaders, party competition and substantial 
lower-class turnout may, other things being equal, lead to redis-
tribution. If leaders cannot or will not keep their pledges, then 
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redistribution will be likely to occur only if the lower class pro-
vides its own leadership-and then watches its every move. 2o 
·Key probably would have modeled the I900-1950 southern 
political system as in Figure 3, where the dotted lines indicate the 
disfranchised voters and there is so little continuity from election 
to election in factional lineups in the multi-candidate Democratic 
primaries that one cannot really tell where each candidate will fall 
or how many candidates there will be. Since a candidate who 
promised a major extension of services for the disfranchised, such 
as for most blacks in the South from 1900 to about I950, could 
expect swift retaliation by the voters, the policies advocated 
would fall in the right-hand hump. But since factionalism, at least 
in the early twentieth-century South, was fluid and since there 
could be multiple candidates, the winner could choose a platform 
anywhere on that mode. And because the lack of factional con-
tinuity from election to election would decrease the voters' ability 
to punish candidates who failed to keep their promises, the poli-
cies eventually adopted might well stray far from the promises 
made, perhaps even meandering into the left half of the redistri-
bution scale. As a consequence, one should expect that a shift 
from a Figure 1 to a Figure 3 polity would, other things being 
equal, not only decrease the redistributiveness of the policies 
adopted, but also pronouncedly increase the amount of variance 
in those policies. 
Figure 4 represents a political system with the same distri-
bution of opinion on issues of redistribution as Key hypothesized, 
and no restrictions on voting, but where the number of parties or 
candidates is indeterminant and the policies eventually adopted 
could fall anywhere on the line. The curves are dotted to reflect 
that, in this case, public opinion and policy are disconnected. This 
graph might represent any of four situations. First, the issue might 
not be salient in voter decisions, perhaps because of a general 
belief that government should not intervene on behalf of any 
particular class. McCormick has argued that such an ideology 
pervaded late nineteenth-century America and hampered impulses 
20 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of 
Modern Democracy (New York, 1962; reprint of 1915 ed.). For a suggestive use of the 
"lower-class party" variant of Key, see Edward T. Jennings, Jr., "Competition, Consti-
tuencies, and Welfare Policies in American States," American Political Science Review, 
LXXIII (1979), 414-429. 
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toward governmental activism. Thus, on the line of redistribution 
the coordinate of the policy adopted would be an unintended 
consequence of stands taken on other issues. 21 
Second, there might be multi-candidate competition, in 
which case any candidate placing himself, say, on the left mode 
could always be outflanked on both sides, and, therefore, since 
no particular strategy would insure success, the policy espoused 
by the winner could lie virtually anywhere along the line. The 
same effect could be achieved in a two-party state if each voter 
were to observe the candidates' positions closely and abstain even 
if only slightly displeased with the stand that the politicians whose 
views were closest to his took. The French Fourth Republic may 
roughly have approximated the former case, and Hubert Hum-
phrey's fate in the 1968 presidential election is at least popularly 
attributed to massive abstention because of the alienation of the 
left on the Vietnam w.ar issue. 22 
Third, open competition might not be allowed, as in Com-
munist countries, and the policies would be determined by other 
factors. If the party in power were ideologically committed to 
leftist policies, as most Communist parties are, the policies would 
generally be leftist or, if the party were of the opposite ideological 
persuasion, as is the Chilean junta, for instance, the policies would 
be rightist. This observation shows that party competition is not 
a necessary prerequisite of redistributive policies and explains the 
finding of some cross-national studies that Communist and non-
Communist countries have adopted similar welfare policies; but 
it suggests also that the variance in policies adopted by Figure 4 
polities should be greater than those of Figure r countries. 23 
Fourth, suppose that for some reason, perhaps one of those 
just enumerated, bureaucrats or interest groups rather than voter-
oriented politicians made the crucial policy decisions. Then, re-
gardless of the distribution of public opinion or the amount of 
turnout or the nature of party competition, the policies could fall 
anywhere on the line. Policy would then vary with the tastes of 
bureaucrats or the comparative strength of various interest 
21 McCormick, "Party Period," 291-292. 
22 Downs, Economic Theory, 142-163. 
23 For cross-national studies, see Jackman, Politics and Social Equality; Harold L. Wilen-
sky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures 
(Berkeley, 1975). 
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groups, and one would expect, for example, that a dispropor-
tionate rise in labor union strength would cause a polity to shift 
to the left, whereas a similar growth of organization among big 
businesses would signal a rightward trend. 24 The growth of the 
bureaucratic state, however, would shield policy determination 
from public opinion, a consideration which implies that one 
should search for direct connections between electoral politics and 
policies in areas where bureaucratic domination is weakest, where 
functionaries have the least independent power, or at a time before 
they became entrenched. 
Although the informal discussion of bimodal models has 
suggested explanations for various findings in the policy outputs 
literature and prescriptions for future studies, one should not 
hastily assume a bimodal distribution of public opinion. After all, 
one of the problems with policy output studies noted earlier is 
that in most cases there are no direct measures of demands. What 
if the distribution were unimodal? Figure 5 represents the most-
studied case in spatial modeling, a symmetric unimodal distri-
bution in which two-party competition drives both parties to 
adopt the position of the median voter. To partisans of Barry 
Goldwater in 1964 and George Wallace in 1968, this diagram aptly 
described American national politics. 
However, suppose that, because of historic party identifica-
tion or some other reason, one of the parties was too weak to 
pose a real threat to the other. Then the majority party could take 
any position on the line, although a risk-averse party might feel 
constrained not to wander too far from the median, as indicated 
by the dashed lines in Figure 6. The risk-averse majority (PMa) 
locates between the dashed lines, whereas the gambling parties 
(P GL and P GR) take the positions to the left and right of the spec-
trum. Figure 6 might well fit American states or Congressional 
districts in which one party has remained dominant for a long 
period, and the incentive for the minority to gamble in such 
circumstances might account for the recurrent anomaly in recent 
United States politics of Democrats "leap-frogging" entrenched 
Republicans and taking more rightist stances than GOP incum-
bents, and, conversely, Republicans challenging Democratic 
24 Alexander Hicks, Friedland, and Edwin Johnson, "Class Power and State Policy: The 
Case of Large Business Corporations, Labor Unions, and Governmental Redistribution 
in the American States," American Sociological Review, XLIII (1978), 302-315. 
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placeholders from the left. If we compared Figure 5 to Figure 6 
polities, they would adopt fairly similar policies on the average, 
but there would probably be much more dispersion in the choices 
of the latter than the former. 2s 
Consider further a shift from Figure 5 to Figure 7, which, 
paralleling the change from Figure 1 to Figure 3, represents the 
disfranchisement of the lower classes and the ending of organized 
party competition. As in the earlier discussion, one would expect 
the policies adopted by the regimes after the change to be both 
less redistributive, although perhaps not as much less as in the 
bimodal case, and less predictable than those of the administra-
tions before the change. 
But suppose an analyst found that policies did not vary sys-
tematically across systems which diverged widely on measures of 
turnout or competition. Then either we would be back in the 
unstable case of Figure 2, or the more stable one of Figure 4, 
allowing unimodal distributions with side conditions analogous 
to the bimodal case in each, or we would have to hypothesize a 
set of much narrower, more sharply peaked distributions, one of 
which is represented in Figure 8. For it is two-party competition 
which drives policy to the center in Figures I and 5; without that 
competition, societies with bimodal or broad unimodal distribu-
tions would almost certainly experience greater policy variance, 
as in Figures 3, 6, or 7· Only with a distribution· like Figure 8 
would one expect all candidates to bunch around the modal point 
regardless of the degree of competition or the number of candi-
dates. 
Distributions such as Figure 8 appear to capture what mem-
bers of the social determinist school of policy outputs have in 
mind when they consider socioeconomic variables as indicators 
of demands, instead of resource availability. In other words, these 
scholars implicitly view all or at least the vast majority of citizens 
as having identical preference functions. If their contentions can 
be extended to issues of redistribution, which they are somewhat 
loathe to do, the implication is that each type of society is char-
25 The effect of risk aversion on spatial choice has been studied under somewhat different 
conditions by Kenneth A. Schepsle, "The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Elec-
toral Competition," American Political Science Review, LXVI (1972), 555-568; Richard D. 
McKelvey, "Some Strategic Aspects of Ambiguity in Spatial Models of Policy Forma-
tion," Public Choice, XXXV (1980), 385-402. 
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acterized by a firm policy consensus. 26 Less developed states or 
countries have either less taste for redistributive policies than their 
mot;e fortunate counterparts, or are less able to indulge their 
desires. If the contrast in policies adopted is determined largely 
by such differences in tastes, then Figure 9 might adequately 
represent public opinion in two polar cases. In each of the two 
states, which appear on the same graph for convenience, the 
public overwhelmingly agrees on policies, and any candidate 
would be irrational to stray to a position on the line not under 
the closed umbrella of consensus. If a polity in which opinion was 
distributed as in Figure 8 disfranchised a segment of the populace 
or ended party competition, policy would not change, for only 
the height of the mode would diminish. 27 
All nine of the figures presented probably apply to some 
issues in some locations at some times, as the examples discussed 
along with each sugg~st. The problem is that since the analyst 
often lacks direct measures of demand, not to mention an appro-
priate metric, he can seldom apply any one of them with perfect 
confidence. He should, however, try to step back and consider 
which might be most appropriate in a given circumstance, and, 
26 Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 262. 
27 There are interesting parallels between the clashes among students of policy outputs 
in political science and the arguments over consensus interpretations of American history 
during the 196os. Many on the political left as well as the right in political science agree 
that "politics doesn't make a difference" in capitalist bureaucratic states, just as many 
leftist historians join their right-wing colleagues in the belief that consensus rather than 
conflict has characterized the history of American politics. (Surely Gabriel Kolko, The 
Triumph of Conservatism [New York, 1963] is as much a work of consensus history as any 
of the books by Richard Hofstadter.) In each case, liberals and moderate leftists have stood 
fast in the belief that the "democratic class struggle" has often found expression in 
politics-that, at least under certain conditions or in certain instances, the lower class could 
express and obtain its will through normal political channels. The correlation of both 
debates with ideological world views, and especially the fact that the "equations" for 
positions on the consensus-conflict dependent variable, to allow a fanciful regression 
equation, are dominated by a quadratic term-that is, both ideological extremes share a 
consensus on consensus, whereas the centrists are more likely to see conflict-indicates 
the unlikelihood of resolving either debate. True believers will explain away evidence. 
And even a general exogenous shift of opinion toward one end of the political spectrum, 
which might settle simpler controversies by decimating one side's adherents, will not 
resolve these battles. In these cases, a leftward or rightward shift will change the balance 
between leftist and rightist adherents of consensus or social determinism, but it will not 
eliminate the devotees of conflict and pluralism in the center, or change very much the 
overall strength of the extremes against the middle. Thus, those who plan their careers by 
playing the futures market of intellectual interchange can safely invest in the continuation 
of both of these conflicts. 
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if he can come to no conclusion by mere logic, attempt to deter-
mine how he can g~ about testing one against the other in any 
particular situation. The attractiveness ofKey's models (Figs. 1-
3) is that they follow from the assumption of rational self-interest 
on the part of voters and politicians and his observation of a 
markedly skewed income distribution. If the horizontal axis were 
changed to another group of issues, it might be more difficult to 
specify the assumptions required to produce a particular distri-
bution of opinion or set of political combatants. If, after consid-
erable thought on the part of the data analyst, no distributions or 
strategies were to appear more likely than any others, that very 
fact may imply that it would be unreasonable to expect to observe 
a connection between policies and the political process on such a 
set of issues. Even in the case in which none of the models fits, 
the exercise should at least stimulate clearer thinking by forcing 
the observer to be more self-conscious about the appropriateness 
of his assumptions and about the applicability of the various 
simplifying devices to particular cases. 
To illustrate how the preceding observations about the policy 
outputs and spatial modeling literature might be applied to a 
historical topic, let us consider the development of education in 
the southern United States from 1880 to 1910. A study of that 
development should overcome six problems of previous analyses 
of policy outputs. First, the direct effects of educational benefits, 
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unlike, for example, many of the direct effects of highways, 
recreational expenditures, or national defense, are relatively easily 
divisible and easily assignable to particular persons or groups. It 
makes sense to talk about the distribution of the benefits of edu-
cational spending; whereas, it is much more difficult to divide the 
shares of purer public goods. 
Second, the distributional issue, although of varying impor-
tance from campaign to campaign, was clearly central throughout 
the period. When Radical Republican governments assumed 
power during Reconstruction, practically the first thing that they 
did was to set up public school systems; and both their educational 
programs and rhetoric were suffused with egalitarian sentiments. 
When Redeemer governments, dominated by wealthy Demo-
crats, and often, as in Texas and Mississippi, spearheaded by tax-
cutting movements, took over from the Radicals, they reduced 
general spending levels for education, thereby punishing most of 
those who could not afford private schools. In other states, such 
as North Carolina, the Redeemers combined overall spending 
cuts and tax limitations with decentralization of finance and con-
trol, thereby mandating malapportionment of schooling. The 
movements at the beginning of the century for increased local 
taxation, and legislative acts which enabled the multiplication of 
special taxing districts that segregated wealthy from poor areas 
were self-consciously elitist, and succeeded only over the repeated 
and vehement protests of those who wished to spread educational 
opportunity equally. Specific facts aside, education, which con-
sumed 30 to so percent of southern state budgets, and was widely 
believed around the turn of the century to be the key to societal 
progress and equality of opportunity, was an issue which must 
have been extremely salient to most voters. 28 
28 W. E. Burghardt DuBois, Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History 
of the Part which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, I86o-
I88o (New York, 1936), 637-669. Dudley G. Wooten, "The Reconstruction Period, I865-
1874," in Eugene C. Barker (ed.), Texas History (Dallas, 1929), 500-513; William C. 
Harris, The Day of the Carpetbagger: Republican Reconstruction in Mississippi (Baton Rouge, 
1979), 624-628; Horace Mann Bond, The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order 
(Englewood Cliffs, 1934), 92, 105-108. The best places to start to trace the centralization, 
decentralization, and equality arguments are in the periodic reports of state school super-
intendents. See especially those of South Carolina (I881-1882, 631-632; 1899, 21-22; 
1900, 28-29, 32; 1902, 15; 1904, 13; 1910, 12); Mississippi (1872, 19-20; 1904, II); Alabama 
(1908, 118-119). 
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Third, the issue is one for which a calculus of simple self-
interest seems appropriate. From time to time public policy ana-
lyst~ have tried to match public opinion and policy on such issues 
as lotteries or the death penalty. 29 These studies may be possible 
when one has adequate survey data, but scientific surveys only 
began in 1935, and few analysts can hope to make use of an 
extended time series of surveys on important policy issues, at 
least below the national level. In such cases, one is forced to 
hypothesize about the shape of public opinion on an issue, subject 
to whatever approximate tests of the assumptions are available, 
and it is therefore helpful to choose policy areas in which relatively 
simple hypotheses seem adequate. 
Fourth, by concentrating on the period from I88o to I9IO, 
one escapes the homogenized world of the present, and has a long 
enough time series to observe major alterations in policy. The 
period largely precedes the development of potent bureaucracies 
and scholastic interest' groups, at least in the South, and one may 
therefore avoid having to disentangle the impact of these groups 
on policy. 
Fifth, the data set--essentially all of the counties of the eleven 
ex-Confederate states, with the statistics often separated by race-
is large and diverse enough to provide an adequate amount of 
variance in both potential independent and dependent variables. 
The general topic is also small enough and the secondary literature 
rich enough to enable a diligent researcher to uncover many 
crucial details which someone studying, say, all countries in the 
developed world, could miss. 
Finally, there are three ways roughly to determine the shape 
of public opinion on the issue. Models of individual behavior are 
therefore possible, at least in principle. First, there are a few 
statewide referenda on distribution-related issues. In 1882, for 
instance, Kentucky, which did not really secede, but which has 
always been at least "romantically" southern, held a referendum 
on whether to increase the white property tax rate by I o percent 
in order to triple school expenditures for blacks, thereby equal-
izing state-level expenditures for both races. The correlates of 
voting patterns on this proposal indicate a good deal about the 
29 For example, Weber and Shaffer, "Public Opinion and American State Policy-Mak-
ing." 
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opinions on black education of voters with various characteris-
tics.30 
, A second way to approximate demand is to look at variations 
in local tax rates. Those areas which had higher tax rates must 
have been willing to pay a larger proportion of their incomes for 
the education of their children than those in low-tax areas, other 
things being equal. If the taxes were highest where the peo'ple 
were poorest, which was overwhelmingly the case in North Car-
olina, for instance, then it is but a short step to conclude that the 
poor, black and white, had a strong demand for redistribution 
through taxes and spending, whereas the wealthy, nearly all 
white, were content to finance their own schools at their current 
low tax rates without increasing their subsidy to the children of 
the less fortunate. 31 
A third way to learn something about opinion on redistri-
bution is to look at the actions of state legislators in key sessions. 
In I 870 in North Carolina, for instance, legislators from rich 
counties generally supported the shift from a statewide to a 
county-wide collection and disbursement of funds. In I883 in 
North Carolina, in I886 in Alabama, and at other times in other 
states, legislatures passed laws allowing local school boards to 
discriminate against blacks in the allocation of funds within coun-
ties or districts. Although these cases have not yet been studied 
in detail, their analysis should reveal a good deal about attitudes 
toward inequality of educational opportunity for blacks. 32 
A related issue considered by several southern legislators and 
constitutional conventions suggests one measure for the distri-
bution of educational benefits. In the late I86os and early I870s, 
and again after blacks were substantially disfranchised about I 900, 
there were widespread calls, especially from wealthy white Dem-
ocrats, for the passage oflaws or constitutional amendments deny-
ing funds raised from taxes on whites to go to black education. 
Since blacks were almost all poor, confining their schools to the 
relative pittances which could be raised from taxes on blacks 
meant consigning their schools to severe and permanent inferi-
30 Kousser, "Making Separate Equal: Integration of Black and White School Funds in 
Kentucky," Journal of Interdisdplinary History, X (1980), 339-4.2.8. 
31 Kousser, "Progressivism-for Middle-Class Whites Only," 176, 191. 
3.2. Bond, Education of the Negro, .107-109. 
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ority. Because such blatant discrimination might have inflamed 
northern public opinion, or have been invalidated by the courts, 
and .because less obvious, but equally effective means of discrim-
ination existed, none of these laws passed. 
The proposals inspired an index of racial discrimination over 
time which might be called the "black balance of payments." For 
a few states where data on taxes and spending are available by 
color for the whole period, one can determine the proportion of 
expenditures which went to blacks and the proportion of direct 
taxes paid by blacks. The statewide trends for North Carolina are 
presented in Table I, which is based on data collected for each of 
the thirty years and averaged over five-year periods in order to 
equalize the numbers of observations for each period and to 
smooth out the impact of nonrecurring expenses for school con-
struction. 33 
The trend in the table is clear enough. The level of the white 
subsidy to black education was roughly constant from I88o to 
I900, when the state passed a law which disfranchised at least 95 
percent of the blacks. The subsidy immediately dropped to about 
half of the pre-I900 level, and fell off by another 20-25 percent 
in the last part of the period. A shift from a Figure I to Figure 3 
polity appears to have occurred, and the connection between 
electoral and policy changes seems strong. 
Even more interesting is the alteration in the correlates of the 
black balance of payments over time. Table 2 presents ordinary 
least squares regression coefficients for county-level data in North 
Carolina. A wide assortment of variables was initially included in 
Table 1 Statewide Trends in the "Black Balance of Pay-
ments," 1880-1910 
PERIOD 
I880-1884 
1886-1890 
1891-1895 
BALANC£'1 
.205 
.177 
.174 
PERIOD 
1896-I900 
ll)OI-1905 
1906-1910 
BALANC£'1 
.189 
·097 
.057 
a Black proportion of expenditures minus black proportion of property 
and poll taxes. 
33 Indirect taxes accounted for only about 12% of total school expenditures and there 
was no clear trend in the proportion of support from such sources. 
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Table 2 The Shifting Correlates of the Black Balance of Payments-
Multiple Regression Statistics 
PERIOD PERCENT PERCENT WHITE WEALTH CONSTANT R2 
. 
NEGRO NEGRo2 (IN $1000) 
1880-1884 +0.543 -O.J3a +o.o5a -.02 .863 
1885-1890 +1.023 -I.I5a +0.02 -.04 
·753 
1891-1895 +o.85a -o.8~ +o.o2 -.02 
·743 
1896-1900 +o.85a -o.85a +0.01 -.02 .693 
1901-1905 +0.32a -0.40a +0.09 -.04 
·53 3 
1906-1910 -o.o8 -O.OI +o.o6 +.01 . I I 
a These numbers are significant at the .os level. 
the regression equations, and I eliminated those which had no 
significant coefficients. Removal of the extraneous terms left the 
remaining parameter estimates virtually unaffected. The pattern 
of coefficients for the.percentage Negro variable is the most strik-
ing facet of the table: it is strongly positive. 
While blacks enjoyed the vote, they were apparently able to 
use their political power to extract a larger subsidy from whites 
in counties where there were a great many black votes, despite 
the fact that it was precisely in those counties where white racism 
and the plantation economy's hierarchic socioeconomic structure 
were strongest. After disfranchisement, black votes lost their 
value as currency negotiable for government benefits. 
It .is unlikely that this marked distributional shift merely 
reflected some underlying socioeconomic upheaval, for, first, the 
correlation between the black payments account and the wealth 
per white male adult stayed fairly constant and insignificant 
through the era. Second, the economy improved markedly after 
1900. The statewide value of real and personal property per white 
male adult, which had varied from $875 in the early r88os to $798 
in the still depressed late 1890s, jumped to $904 and $1,094 in the 
last two periods. The 37 percent rise in property value in a decade 
meant that the state was capable of distributing a larger amount 
to its poor after 1900 than before; instead, it gave a markedly 
lower percentage of available funds to blacks, which decreased 
the relative standing of black vis-a-vis white schools, and there-
fore made the black opportunity to progress through schooling 
increasingly unequal. And the perfect correlation over time be-
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tween disfranchisement and the diminution of the black balance 
of payments strongly suggests that politics made all the difference. 
Although it would be possible to present further numbers 
making essentially the same point through different means, the 
major conclusions are clear. In turn-of-the-century southern ed-
ucation, Figures I and 3-not Figures 8 and 9, which best rep-
resent the Dye dogma-sketch the before and after pictures pretty 
well. The decisive factor was the shift in the distribution of ex-
penditures and taxes from one which favored blacks to one which 
left them approximately as badly off as they were under the non-
governmental, socioeconomic status quo. 34 
The example from educational policy in the South demonstrates 
concretely what the review of the two political science subfields 
asserted: historians should not uncritically accept and apply the 
findings, methods, and conceptual frameworks of the dominant 
school of policy outputs studies. Rather, ifhistorians ground their 
investigations firmly in theories of individual behavior, choose 
data sets carefully, and combine meticulous studies of the relevant 
events and institutional environment with quantitative analyses, 
they have the opportunity to make a unique and original contri-
bution to the study of policy by helping to specify the conditions 
under which mass politics will make a greater or lesser difference 
in policy. Such a deeper understanding should lead to the con-
struction of more fully articulated and complex models of the 
process of policymaking in different areas at different times and 
should strengthen the relationship between sophisticated tech-
niques and sophisticated theory. Since a comprehensive view will 
give the choices of voters, institutional rules, and candidate and 
bureaucratic strategies a prominent place in the theoretical struc-
ture, historians who play a role in creating that structure will at 
the same time be restoring politics to the central place it deserves 
in political history. 
34 For an expanded discussion of the case sketched out here see Kousser, "Progressiv-
ism-For Middle-Class Whites Only." Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth, Dimensions in 
Urban History, 145, draw similar conclusions about the relation of turnout to educational 
expenditures in the tum-of-the-century South. 
